ASSAQAF IS WRONGED BY ALALBANI
Fetawi AlAlbani, page 520:
Q. AsSaqaf has fabricated a new heresy when he claimed his ability to prove Allah's being aloft the heavens, like that bondmaiden.
A. Escaping from attestation, such individuals utter such statements. In his books, the man affirms that declaring of Allah's being in the heavens is a sort of atheism. He also claims Allah's being neither in a certain place nor out of space. He also claims Allah's being neither in nor out of this cosmos. The man, then, follows trifles of Tatilites.
The bondmaiden mentioned in the question above is that who, before the Prophet, pointed to the heavens as an indication to Allah. The Prophet, however, accepted her indication. Wahabists cited this narrative as their evidence on God's occupying an aloft locality. AsSaqaf refuted this exegesis. He only believed in authenticity of that bondmaiden's claim of God's being immaterially exalted. This is a true claim admitted by the entire Muslims other than corporalists. As he could not welcome this, AlAlbani accused AsSaqaf, as well as every denier of God's materiality, of being Tatilite. The same judgment of AlAlbani's ancestors is repeated. They decided atheism of every individual contradicting their beliefs.
AtThehbi's TarikhulIslam, part 14 page 384:
Safwan Bin Salih: Marwan Bin Mohammed decides those who assert that Allah does not have an eye or a hand, as followers of Tatilism.
For Wahabists, it is essential to admit the Lord's physical attributes; such as the foot, hand, eye, face and other organs, otherwise reckoning with Tatilites, who deny the divine attributes and names, is decided.
This is the ill thoroughly material utterance of these faction who, stubbornly or senselessly, confuse qualities of organs to attributes of denotation and these of deeds. Accordingly, corporalists and anthropomorphists became quite faithful believers, while deciders of God's being promoted against unfitting matters, who disavow ascribing material qualities to the Lord and form majority of Muslims, became Tatilites, apostates and disbelievers.
This is the very Jewish scrupulous materiality adopted by ulema of the two holy precincts, who intend, by means of spending fortunes and recruiting Indian and Syrian scholastic individuals, to make the Islamic world submit to it. This is in the twentieth century which witnessed collapse of the historical materialism.
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THESES OF PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGISTS REGARDING DENIAL OF GOD'S CORPOREITY AND LOCALITY
Keshful Murad Fi Sharhi Tajridulitiqad, page 154:
Text: For every corporeality, there is a natural space required when left, from the nearest way.
Explanation: Absolutely every corporeality wants a space to occupy. It is impracticable for any corporeality to be existing without space. Necessarily, that space is natural for the corporeality. Supposing corporealities are deprived of contingent affairs, they shall be either occupying no locality at all, or occupying the entire space. The earlier is impracticable, and the latter is essentially void and null. Corporealities may occupy some locations that should be natural. Accordingly, every corporeality should return to its position. Usually, corporealities take the most straight paths when return.
Text: It shall be nonexistent when innumerable.
Explanation: There is only one natural space for each corporeality. If there were two or more places, one should be left during the corporeality's occupying the other. This left place would no longer be natural. This is the meaning of his saying that nonexistence of naturality should be ruled when there are numerous places for a single corporeality.
Keshful Murad Fi Sharhi Tajridulitiqad, page 317:
10. Allah, The Exalted, Is Not Compound.
Text: As well as composition, in all its forms…
Explanation: This implies that necessity of existence requires denial of composition. This is evidenced by the fact that every compound being lacks its parts, since it shall be nonexistent unless these parts compose its being. Besides, parts of a being vary each other. Things lacking others are possible. Correspondingly, Allah, the Necessary, is possible if He lacks parts. So, necessity of existence rules of denial of composition.
Composition may be either inherent or extrinsic. The first is that composed of genus and class while the second is that composed of material and form, such as corporealities or amounts. All these things are dispelled from Allah, the Necessary. The entire compound matters lack their parts, while the Lord has no genus, class or any other material parts.
13. Allah is not incarnating in other beings.
Text: …and incarnation…
Explanation: Necessity of Existence requires that Allah, the Exalted, does not incarnate in other beings. Majority of intellectual people agree upon this point.
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Some of the Christians, who claim the Lord's incarnating in Messiah, and the Sufis, who believe in the Lord's incarnating in corporealities of some of their spiritualists, disagree. This faith is too ridiculous to be discussed, since the credible concept of incarnation means that a being, that is incapable of existing independently, finds a location in another on basis of fellowship. This meaning, however, is impracticable for Allah, the Exalted, since it necessitates possibility.
14. Denial of the Lord's combination
Text: …and combination…
Explanation: Necessity of existence contradicts combination. Previously, we have explicated that necessity of existence requires oneness. In case the Necessary Existent combines with another thing, it is most surely that thing should be possible. Thus, qualities of the possible existent will be born by the being combining it. As a result, the necessary existent will be transferring into a possible existent.
Furthermore, in case of combination, the two combined beings should be either independently existent; hence, the combination will be null, or both or one of them will be nonexistent; hence, the combination will be null, too, or the necessity will be null. Consequently, the necessary existent will be possible. This is contrast.
15. Denial of the Lord's occupying a locality.
Text: …and locality…
Explanation: This is one of the rulings required by the Necessary Existent. The entire corporalists disputed about this point. They believed in the Lord's occupying a definite locality. Followers of Abu Abdillah Bin AlKarram were engaged in discrepancy in this regard. Mohammed Bin Heitham claims the Lord's being in an endless region atop the Throne. He also claims that the distance between the Lord and the Throne is infinite. Some claim the finitude of that distance. Others adopted corporalists' claim of the Lord's being over the Throne. All the previous beliefs are valueless, since every occupant is demonstrated and suffering contingent manners. Contingent beings, however, are not necessary.
ALFAKHR ARRAZI'S THESIS OF DENIAL OF ALLAH'S CORPOREALITY
AlMetalibul Aliya, volume 2 part 2 page 25:
Chapter Three: Providing evidences on impracticability of Allah's being a corporeality
In this regard, scholars have two opinions. Majority of Muslims compromised that Allah is promoted against having a corporeality and occupying a definite
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space. Others, corporalists, claimed His being defined by a certain space. However, the latter disagree upon certain points.
1. Regarding the Lord's having a definite look, there are two opinions. Some claimed the Lord's having the appearance of human beings, while others denied so. Muslim anthropomorphists claim the Lord's having an appearance of a young man. Jew anthropomorphists claim His having an appearance of an old man. Others claim His being a tremendous light.
Abu Mashar, the astronomer, asserts that because the preliminary people adopted faith of the Lord's being a corporeality, and being a tremendous light while the angels are less tremendous, they betook a pagan larger than the others so as to express the Great Lord. They also betook smaller pagans with different manners so as to express the angels. They engaged themselves in adoring these statues considering them as the Lord and the angels. This was the main reason beyond paganism. This proves that paganism is a branch of anthropomorphism.
2. Corporalists disagreed upon the idea whether the Lord is able of coming, going, moving and stilling. A group of Karramites refuted so, while others affirmed. Majority of Hanbalites affirmed.
3. Adopters of Allah's being a light, deny His having organs and limbs; such as the head, the hand and the foot. Most of Hanbalites assert the Lord's having organs.
4. Unanimously, corporalists opted for the Lord's being in the highest space. This provides three probabilities. The Lord is either coping with the Throne, varying it in a limited dimension or varying it in a limitless dimension. Hence, corporalists were of three groups depending on the three previous probabilities.
5. Corporalists agree upon the Lord's having a limit from beneath. They, however, disagree about the other five sides. Some claim the Lord's being limited from the entire sides. Others claim the Lord's being limited only from beneath. Others claim the Lord's being limitless from the upward, and limitless from the other sides.
6. corporalists disagree whether the Lord occupies that definite space by Essence or for an idiosyncratic objective that necessitates His being in that space. This is similar to their contrariety on the idea whether Allah, the Exalted, is Knowing by His Essence, or by means of knowledge.
7. Corporalists disagree whether the Lord's knowledge, competence, will, hearing, seeing and articulation are equal manners of His corporeality, or each of these attributes occupies a definite part of His corporeality, exclusively dedicated to the attribute involved.
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There are a number of proofs evidencing that Allah, the Exalted, is promoted against having corporeality and definite size.
First proof: No necessary Aseity can be possible existent by essence. Every occupant is possible existent by essence; therefore, the necessary Aseity can never be occupant. The minor is logically acceptable. The major is provable since every occupant is component. Every composite is possible existence by essence. Hence, every occupant is possible existence by essence. For proving that every occupant is component, the following points are provided.
1. There must be a difference between the right and the left of every occupant. Hence, it must be component. This means that every occupant is component. Full rendition regarding this point is cited during providing evidences on denial of atoms.
2. Philosophers said, "Every corporeality is composed of prime matter and form."
3. Every occupant shares others in having a space, and varies them in having a clear space. The common feature of occupation enjoyed by every occupant is different from the distinctive feature consecrated to occupants exclusively. It is inevitable that every occupant should be composed of that common space and the distinctive feature. Hence, every occupant is composed.
For clarifying that every composed being is possible, it is to say that every composed being lacks its definite space which is unlike it. Every composed being lacks other matters. Every being lacking others is possible existence be essence. This results in the fact that every composed being is possible existent by essence.
Second proof: The Lord resembles other occupants, in matters of quiddity, if He is occupant. This is impracticable since the first is impracticable.
To explicate so, it is to say that if the Lord is an occupant, He will be equal to other occupants in feature of having space. This leads to one of two probabilities; either contrasting other corporealities in one of the fundamentals of quiddity, or not. The first is logically invalid since if the Lord is equal to occupants, in feature of being spaced, and contrasts them in one of the fundamentals of quiddity, then the common feature of occupation is variant from the distinctive feature and, by the same token, the Lord's occupation is different from competency of contrasting; therefore, the second is valid.
Proving this, we say that the two previous features should be either attributes of each other, or not, or the distinctive feature is attributed while the common feature is the attribute. The first three probabilities are invalid. Hence, the fourth is only endurable. This leads to the fact that corporealities are analogous in ultimate quiddity. Nullity of the first probability is proved by the fact that providing it is true, each should be independent and idiosyncratic. This is
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untrue because of their being lacking others. Likewise, nullity of the second probability is proved by the fact that should that have been true, the two features would not have been interrelated. This, however, is not a discussion of the coalescing essence. Nullity of the third probability is proved by the condition that if the distinctive feature was the essence, and the common feature was the attribute, then the distinctive feature should be either given the space exclusively, or not. If the previous is adopted, it is, then, an occupying corporeality that is, essentially, the part of quiddity of a corporeality, should be a corporeality. This is logically impracticable. If the latter is adopted, it is, then, impossible for occupants to have space, since that being is not practicable to spaces. Occupants, as a matter of fact, necessarily occupy that space. It is intellectually impracticable for the necessarily occupying matters to occur to matters that are impossibly occupying spaces.
Thusly, the three previous probabilities are null and void. Only should the fourth endure. It is that the common feature, which is the process of occupation, is the essence, and the distinctive feature is the attribute. Proving that there is only one concept for the process of occupation. This alludes to the fact that the entire occupants are similar in quitty and entity. This verifies our claim that the Lord should have been similar, in quitty and entity, to the other occupying beings had He been occupant. For the following reasons, we maintain impracticability of that exposition.
1. Inevitably, matters fully similar in quitty should be equal in necessities and results. Hence, corporealities, as a whole, should be either selfsufficient from the Agent, or depending totally on the Agent. The earlier is null since we have previously proved contingency of the cosmos and its necessity to the Agent. Hence, the second is active. This leads to proving the fact that every occupant is in necessity to the Agent. Hence, the Creator of everything is not an occupant.
2. That corporeality's exclusive knowledge, competence and godhead should be either necessary or possible. The earlier is null and void. Supposing it is true, it is necessary for the entire corporealities to enjoy these attributes since it is provable that matters of the same category should enjoy the same necessities. The latter is also void since if it is true, it is occurred by a definite specialist actor. If that actor is a corporeality, the same wording should be resaid, otherwise, it will be the required.
3. Supposing corporealities are similar, they all should enjoy the same attributes. Hence, it is impracticable to regard some of them as anterior, while the others as contingent. If so, the anterior should be contingent, and the contingent should be anterior. This is logically infeasible.
4. Like other corporeality's, the Lord's corporeality should be suffering separation and amputation. Similarly, as other corporealities suffer extension,
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reduction, decay and corruption, the Lord's should be suffering so, too. Familiarly, this is infeasible and null.
5. Parts of that corporeality are supposed to be fully equal in quiddity. Since some of them occur in the lower part while others occur in the upper, then it is practical for those falling in the lower to occupy the place of those of the upper. Supposing so, position of each part must have been chosen by an expert actor. For the lord of this cosmos, this is impracticable. Although this proof is very effective, philosophers do not rest upon, since it supports the ideas of separability and cicatrization of the cosmos.
Third proof: The Lord is finite if He is occupant. Every finite is possible. Necessary Existent is not possible. Hence, the occupant is not necessary existent by essence. The idea that every finite is possible is proved by a number of evidences referring to finitude of dimensions. Likewise, by citing the fact that it is supposable to believe that every amount must have been increased or decreased, we can prove that every finite is possible. Besides, it is essential to acquaint affirmation of the possibility involved. This asserts possibility of every occupant. The Necessary Existent is not possible. This arises the conclusion that no single occupant is necessary existent. By reversing so, it is to say that no single necessary existent is an occupant.
Fourth proof: The Lord is equal to other occupants if He is occupant. Thus, He is either having the same fundamentals of other occupants, or not. Regarding the earlier, the occupant should be a genus subclassified into species. Regarding the latter, the occupant should be a species subclassified into persons.
The earlier is null. Providing its validity, the necessary existent must be composed of species, which is the common feature of occupants, and the class, which is the distinctive feature. Every composed being is possible. This will arise the contrast that the necessary existent is the possible existent.
The latter is null, too. The common feature of occupation is shared by the entire persons. The distinctive feature is dedicated to each person independently. Hence, the distinctive feature is inordinate to the quantitative nature. In addition, that feature is necessitated by the consecratory characteristic. But we have previously decided its being common among persons. This is, then, contradiction.
If the feature is independent, then each person of the occupying corporeality will be identified by an independent reason; therefore, it will not be necessary existent by essence. This confirms that every corporeality is possibly existent by essence. Whatever is not possible necessary by essence should never be a corporeality.
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Fifth proof: The Lord suffers separability and laceration if He is a corporeality. As the earlier is impossible, the latter is impossible, too. Supposing the Lord is constituent, each of His parts must be continually decomposable till it becomes simple. If so, then characteristics of the right side must not be different from these of the left, lest, He should be compound. Similarly, if equality of the two sides, in nature and quiddity, is proved, then it is positive that what is touched by a side must be touched by the other in the same manner. This implies that whatever touches the other part with one of its two faces, can validly touch with the other. This proves practicability of separation and laceration.
Impossibility of the Lord's being separable and decomposable is proved by the thesis that inseparability of the Lord cannot be preferred to His separability unless there is a favorable extraneous reason. This shows the Lord's lacking an extraneous reason. It is unrealizable for the necessary existent by essence to lack. Hence, the necessary existent by essence is not a corporeality.
Sixth proof: The Lord is a corporeality if He is occupier. No sane confirms the Lord's being as minute as an atom. Corporealities are compound. Attributes of knowledge, competence and the like should either be a part of that corporeality, or the amount. Assuming the earlier is true, the Lord must be that part alone. This results in considering the Lord as minute as an atom. Considering the latter, these attributes should be either comprised by the entire parts, or distributing parts of the attributes on parts of the corporeality, or an independent part of each attribute occurs in each part of the corporeality. The earlier is null since it is impracticable for a single attribute to occupy more than a single position. The second is impracticable since it is unworkable for knowledge, for instance, to be divisible. The latter is also impracticable since it requires that each part of the corporeality should bear the whole divine attributes. This leads to variety of lords.
It may be suggested that the previous proofs are dedicated to corporealities of humans that are divisible. Hence, each part should have an independent knowledge, competence and the like. This means a single man should be a number of knowledgeable and competent numbers.
As an answer, we say that philosophers deny claims of wholeness. They ascribe qualities of knowledge, competence and the like to souls consecratorily. Otherwise, impossibility should be supposed. AlAshari adopted the claim that each part of human corporealities comprises definite knowledge, competence and the like. This is positively inaccurate. It is, however, not impossible.
Ascribing so to the Lord is definitely impossible. It leads to claiming variety of gods.
Seventh proof: If the Lord is corporeality, He is either moveable or immovable. Both probabilities are impossible; therefore, the Lord is not an occupant.
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If the lord of the cosmos is moveable, then there should be no blame to reckon the planets with gods. The sun, the moon and other planets can be gods unless they have three matters.
1. They are compound.
2. They are limited and bound.
3. They are moveable.
Supposing these three matters do not impede godhead, it will be trivial to criticize godhead of such planets. The same is said about the divine Throne and Chair. This is the very atheism and tergiversation and denial of the Creator.
The claim that the Lord of the cosmos is a corporeality that is not submitted to transference and moveableness, is also null for a number of reasons.
First, the Lord shall be seen as the handicapped that is disable to move, if He is immovable. This is, however, a blemish which is impracticable for Allah.
Second, like other corporealities, Allah should be capable of moving if He is a corporeality.
Third, adopters of God's being composed of parts claim His ability of moving. They ascribe processes of going and coming to Him. Once, they assert the Lord's reposing on the Throne while His feet are on the Chair. This is indeed stillness. Once, they relate that He descends to the heavens. This is the moveableness.
