The Kind Of Taqlid That Is Forbidden By The Shari'a

The kind of taqlid that is forbidden by the shari'a

     Let us now turn to taqlid. It is [as was said before] of two kinds: licit and illicit [in terms of the shari'a]. There is a kind of taqlid which is the blind following of one's surroundings and of habit, which is, of course, forbidden, and it is this which is condemned in the Qur'an when those who say : Behold, we found our forefathers agreed on what to believe - and verily, it is but in their footsteps that we follow. (42:23) are condemned. We have said that taqlid is of two kinds: licit and illicit. What we meant by illicit taqlid is not confined solely to the kind of taqlid which is the blind imitation of one's surroundings, of habit, of one's parents or ancestors, but we wanted also to say that taqlid between those who do not have [the necessary] knowledge (al-jahil) and those who do (al-'alim), the consultation of the faqih by the ordinary person, is of two kinds: licit and illicit.

     We occasionally hear these days from some people who are looking for a marja' al-taqlid, that they are looking to find someone to whom they can give unqualified allegiance. We want to say that the taqlid which Islam has commanded is not "unqualified allegiance"; it is the opening, and keeping open, of one's eyes, of awareness. If taqlid takes on an aspect of devotion, thousands of evil affects will come about. Now there is a well-known and detailed hadith on this subject which I shall quote for you : Whichever of the fuqaha can protect his self³⁴, who can preserve his religion, who fights his desires and is obedient to the commands of his Master, should be followed by the people in taqlid.

     This is one of the textual proofs for taqlid and ijtihad. The Shaykh al-Ansari said about this hadith that the signs of truth are evident in it. It is an appendage to the following verse from the Qur'an : And there are among them unlettered people who have no real knowledge of the divine Book, only wishful beliefs, and they depend on nothing but conjecture.(2:78)

     This verse comes in condemnation of the ignorant and illiterate Jews who followed, and practiced taqlid of, their religious scholars and leaders, and it comes after some verses which mention the unattractive behaviour of the Jewish religious scholars. It points out that a group of them were such ignorant and illiterate people that they knew nothing of the divine Book except a string of imaginary beliefs [about it] and such things as they wished to believe, and that they had gone after surmise and illusion.

The hadith of the sixth Imam concerning the kind of taqlid which is illicit

     The following hadith is connected to the previous verse. Someone said to the Imam al-Sadiq that the ordinary, illiterate Jews had no other alternative but to take in everything they heard from their religious scholars and to follow them. If there is any blame, it should be directed towards the Jewish scholars themselves. Why should the Qur'an censure helpless ordinary people who knew nothing and were only following their scholars? What difference is there between the common Jew and the common Muslim? If taqlid by ordinary people and their following of the learned is forbidden, we Muslims, who follow our scholars, this person reasoned, must also be the objects of reprehension and censure. If the former should not have accepted what their scholars said, then the latter should not accept what their scholars say.

     The Imam said : In one respect there is a difference between the ordinary Jew and the Jewish scholars, and the ordinary Muslim and the Muslim scholars, and in another respect there is a similarity. In so far as there is a similarity, God has commanded the ordinary Muslim also not to practice that kind of taqlid of scholars, but in so far as there is a difference, He has not. The person who had asked the Imam then said: O son of the Messenger of Allah, please explain what you mean.

     Then Imam said : The ordinary Jews could see from their scholars and the way that they behaved that they were quite clearly lying: they did not refrain from accepting bribes, they changed the laws and the rulings of the courts in exchange for favours. They knew that they displayed partiality to certain individuals. They indulged their personal likes and dislikes, they would give one man's right to someone else. .. On account of natural, common sense, which God has created in everyone, we all know that we must not accept the speech of people who behave in such a way as this; we must not accept the word of God and the prophets from the tongues of such people as this. What the Imam meant here was that no-one can say that the ordinary Jewish people did not know that they should not act in accordance with what had been said by those of their scholars who acted contrary to the divine commands of their religion. This is not something that someone might not know. Knowledge of this kind is put by God into every person's nature, and everyone's reason acknowledges it. In the terminology of logic, it is a 'inborn' proposition; its proof is contained within itself. According to the dictate of every intellect, one must not pay any attention to the utterance of someone whose philosophy of life is purity and the rejection of the human passions but who pursues what his desires tell him to. Then the Imam continued : It is the same thing for our people: they too, if they understand or see with their own eyes that there is behaviour contrary to the shari'a on the part of their scholars, strong prejudices, a scramble after the ephemera of this world, preference for their own supporters however irreligious they may be, and judgement against their opponents even when they deserve verdicts in their favour, if they perceive such behaviour among them and then follow them, they are just the same as the Jewish people and should be reprimanded and censured.

     So it is clear that unquestioning allegiance and shutting one's eyes to the truth is not the kind of taqlid which is encouraged or permitted by the shari'a. Licit taqlid means having one's eyes open and being observant and alert; otherwise it is accepting responsibility for, and being an accomplice to, an illicit act.

Regarding the popular belief that the 'ulama cannot be tainted by immorality

     Some people imagine that the effect of sin on individuals is not of only one kind: that sin has an effect on ordinary people which annuls their piety and right behaviour, but that it has no effect on the 'ulama' who have some kind of immunity. It is like the difference between a little water and a lot which, if it is more than one kurr³⁵, cannot be tainted by any unclean thing. Now, in fact, Islam does not consider anyone to be untaintable, not even the Prophet. For why then should God have said : [O Prophet] say: 'I also, if I commit a sin, fear punishment on the Great Day.'?

     Why should He have said : If any kind of attributing godhood to other than Allah (shirk) enters your actions, your work will be spoilt ? All this is to show that there is no kind of partiality or discrimination, there is no immunity from sin for anyone. The story of Moses and God's righteous servants, which is in the Qur'an, is a wonderful story. One moral which can be drawn from it is that the follower should surrender to the one he is following up to the point where basic principles and the law are not contravened. If it is seen that the leader does something against these principles, one must not remain silent. It is true that the fact that in the story the things which the servant of God does are not, in his view, against these basic principles, since he sees a wider horizon and can see into the heart of the matter; they were, rather, his very duty and responsibility. But the question here is why Moses was not patient, and why he gave vent to his criticisms, despite the fact that he had promised [the servant of God] and himself that he would not make any objection? Why, then, did he protest and criticise? The defect in Moses' actions was not his protesting and criticising, but the fact that he was not aware of the undivulged aspect of the matter, the inward and secret side of the events. Of course, if he had been aware of the hidden reasons for what happened, he would not have objected, and he would have wanted to discover the secret of the affair; but as long as his actions were, from his own point of view, against basic principles and the divine Law, his faith would not allow him to remain silent. There are those who have said that if the actions of that servant of God were to be repeated on the Day of the Resurrection, Moses would still object to them and criticise them, unless, by that time, he were to become aware of the hidden reasons behind them. Moses said to the servant of God : "Shall I follow you so that you may teach me, of what you have been taught, right judgement."

     "Assuredly you will not be able to bear with me patiently."

     Then he explained the reason very clearly : "And how should you bear patiently what you have never encompassed in your knowledge?"

     Moses said : "Yet you will find me, if Allah will, patient, and I shall not rebel against you in anything."

     Moses did not say that he would be patient whether he discovered the secret of the matter or not. He merely said that he hoped he would have that patience. Of course, this patience did exist within Moses as long as he understood the reason for things. Then the servant of God wanted to have something more definite from him; that, even if he did not discover the reason for what had happened, he would remain silent and not protest until the time came for him to explain. "Then, if you follow me, do not question me on anything until I myself introduce the mention of it to you." (117:66-70)

     Here, the verse does not say if Moses accepted; it only says that after this they both set out together and continued till the end of the story which we all know. 

At any rate, I wanted to show that the ignorant person's taqlid of the learned should not be blind allegiance. The unlawful kind of taqlid between one who is ignorant and one who has knowledge is that kind in which unquestioning obedience exists, which takes some such form as: "an ignorant person cannot quarrel with a learned person; we don't understand, perhaps the duties imposed by the shari'a necessitate its being like this." I have mentioned this story as evidence and corroboration for what was in the hadith of the Imam al-Sadiq.

Taqlid permitted by the shari'a

     After what I have narrated concerning the kind of taqlid forbidden by the shari'a, the Imam went on to explain the kind of taqlid permitted by the shari'a the kind which is to be praised, in these words : Whichever of the fuqaha' can protect his self, who can preserve his religion, who fights his desires and is obedient to the commands of his Master, then he should be followed by the people in taqlid.

     Of course, it is clear that the struggle of a spiritual 'alim with his weaker desires is very different from the struggle of an ordinary person, because the desires of each individual are associated with specific activities. The desires of a youth are one thing, the desires of an old man another; everyone, in whatever position, degree, stage or age he may be, has a particular kind of desire. The standard for subservience to inferior desires for a spiritual 'alim is not what we see: for example, whether he drinks alcohol or not, whether he has stopped praying and fasting or not, whether he gambles or not.³⁷ The standard for the subservience to inferior desires for such a person is whether he desires position, to have his hand kissed, to become famous and popular and have people walk behind him, to use the wealth of the Muslims to lord over others, to allow his friends and relatives, especially his sons, to benefit from the wealth of the Muslims. Then the Imam said : Only some of the Shi'i fuqaha have these great qualities and traits of character, not all of them.

     This hadith, on account of its final phrases, is one of the pieces of evidence in the question of ijtihad and taqlid. So it is clear that both ijtihad and taqlid can be divided into two kinds: that which is permitted by the shari'a and that which is not.

Why is taqlid of a dead person not permitted

     We have a principle in fiqh, which is one of the indisputable points of our fiqh, that taqlid of a dead person in the first instance is not permitted. If taqlid of a dead person is permitted, it is only when taqlid is carried on from someone who was followed [by the same person] while he was alive and is now dead.³⁸Moreover, the carrying on of the taqlid of a dead person must also be with the permission of a living mujtahid. I am not concerned here with the reasons in fiqh for this principle, so I will only say that it is a very basic idea, but only on the condition that the aim of the principle is clearly understood. The first purpose of this principle is that it should be a means for the survival of the traditional centres of learning of the Islamic sciences, so that there should be continuity, and that the Islamic sciences should be perserved - not only preserved, but that they should advance day by day and be perfected, and that those matters which had not previously been solved should be solved.

     It is not the case that all our problems have been solved in the past by our 'ulama', and that now we have no more problems and no more work. We have thousands of riddles and difficulties in kalam (theology), Qur'anic exegesis, fiqh and the other Islamic sciences, many of which have been solved by the great 'ulama' of the past, but many of which remain, and it is the duty of those who follow on to solve them and to gradually write better and more complete texts in each subject, to continue each subject and develop it, just as in the past, too, exegesis, theology and law were gradually developed. The caravan must not be brought to a halt in mid-journey. So people's taqlid of living mujtahids, and their heeding them, is a means to the continuance and development of the Islamic sciences. Another reason is that every day Muslims are faced with new problems in their lives, and they do not know what there duty is in these matters. It is necessary to have living fuqaha', aware of the contemporary situation, to respond to this great need. It is narrated in one hadith concerning ijtihad and taqlid : As for al-hawadith al-waqi'a, refer concerning them to the narrators of our hadith.

     These hawadith al-waqi'a are exactly these new problems which arise as time passes. Study and research into the books of fiqh from different epochs and centuries shows that gradually, according to the needs of the people, new problems arise in fiqh, and that the fuqaha' set out to answer them. It is for this reason that the dimensions of fiqh have increased.

     If a researcher were to make a tally, he could discover, for example, in what century, in what place and for what reason, such-and-such a problem arose in fiqh. If it were not necessary for a living mujtahid to give answers to these problems, what difference would there be between taqlid of a living person and taqlid of a dead person? It would be better to follow in taqlid some of the dead mujtahids like the Shaykh al-Ansari, who, on the admission of the now-living mujtahids themselves, was the most knowledgeable and learned. Basically, the 'secret' of ijtihad lies in applying general principles to new problems and changed circumstances. The real mujtahid is one who has mastered this 'secret', who has observed how things change, and subsequently how the rulings on them have changed. For there is no skill in only thinking about things which are in the past and have already been thought about; or, at the most, changing an 'ala l-aqwa into an 'ala l-ahwat.³⁹ or vice versa; there is no need to make a song and dance about any of this. Of course, ijtihad has many preconditions and prerequisites; a mujtahid must have acquired the various [preliminary] sciences. It is necessary that he should have applied himself to the study of Arabic language and literature, to logic, to the study of usul (jurisprudence), even to the history of Islam and the fiqh of the other sects, so that he might become a true and thorough faqih. No one can ordinarily lay claim to ijtihad just by reading a few books on Arabic grammar, or rhetoric and logic, then three or four of the set books for the intermediate stage, such as the "Fara'id", the "Makasib" or the "Kifaya"⁴⁰, and then spending a few hours in the dars-i kharij.⁴¹ He does not then become qualified to sit with the "Wasa'il" and "Jawahir"⁴², in front of him and issue legal opinions. He must be completely knowledgeable in exegesis and hadith, that is to say in the several thousands of hadith which appeared in the two and a half centuries from the time of the Prophet to the time of the Imam al-Hasan al-'Askari, and of the circumstances in which they appeared; he must also know Islamic history and the fiqh of other Islamic sects, and the narrators of traditions and their biographies and reliability.

     Ayatollah Burujirdi was a true faqih. It is not my habit to mention people by name, and while he was alive I never mentioned him in my lectures. But now that he has died and there can be no ulterior motive, I can say that this man was truly a distinguished and outstanding faqih. He was conversant with, and proficient in, all these sciences, in exegesis, hadith, knowledge of the narrators of hadith, in the sciences of the evaluation of hadith ('ilm al-daraya), and in the fiqh of the other sects of Islam.

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34. Protecting the nafs, the soul, the greater, moral jihad, as opposed to the lesser jihad of protecting Islam against the external enemy.

35. One kurr of water is approximately 377 litres. In religious law if an amount less than this comes into contact with a religiously impure thing, the water too becomes impure, whereas above this amount the purity is not endangered.

36. 'Abd Salih, the "Righteous Servant". For this story see the sura of "al-Kahf', 60-82.

37. Since he obviously refrains from such activities.

38. According to a commonly accepted ruling, this applies only to those matters which the muqallid formerly performed according to the fatawa of the subsequently deceased marja' al-taqlid. If any new matter arises for him, he must follow the fatwa of a living, 'adil mujtahid.

39. Two principles (usul 'amalia) for the preponderance of one opinion over another in fiqh. If one opinion is chosen over another 'ala l-aqwa, it is chosen because the proof for it is thought to be stronger; if it chosen 'ala l-ahwat, it is because of the principle of precaution (ihtiyat) which requires that what is least likely to be at variance with the shari'a should be adopted. It will be appreciated that there may be a good deal of rather trivial argument as to whether one or the other of the two opinions should be chosen, according to which of these two principles is preferred.

40. a) for "Fara'id al- Usul", see above, note 26. b) "Kitab al-Makasib", also by the Shaykh al-Ansari, an extensive exposition of the section in fiqh on transactions. c) "Kifayat al-Usul" (2 vols, Tehran, n.d.) by "Akhund" Mulla Muhammad Kazim al-Khurasani (d. 1329/1911), a systematic text on usul al-fiqh.

41. After the student (talaba, lit. 'seeker') has completed his reading of the main texts and mastered the necessary preliminary sciences, he may continue to the more detailed, but also more specialised, courses given by the main teachers of the subjects concerned. These lessons, the dars-i kharij, are kharij to (outside, beyond) the texts, and the teacher will expound his own opinions, thus teaching the actual practice of ijtihad. The teacher will be able to assess the abilities of his pupils in these classes, and, in the case of fiqh, may subsequently award a certificate of ijtihad to those he considers to have mastered all the required skills and to be consequently in a position to employ them to arrive at their own legal opinions (see also above, note 23).

42. a) "Wasa'il al-Shi'a" (ed. 'A. al-Rabbani M. al-Razi, 20 vols, Tehran, 1376 -1389), by the Shaykh Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Hurr al-'Amili (d. 1104/1693); the most comprehensive collection of hadith relevant to fiqh, arranged according to subject matter. b) "Jawahir al-Kalam" (ed. 'A. Quchani et al., 43 vols, Najaf-Qum-Tehran, 1377-1401), by the Shaykh Muhammad Hasan b. Baqir al-Najafi (d. 1266/1849); an extensive commentary on the "Sharayi' al-Islam" by the Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (602/1202 - 676/1277).